We investigate effects of corn-based ethanol plants on local land uses using countylevel panel data for Iowa for 1997 through 2009 and an Arellano-Bond differencegeneralized method-of-moments estimator. Our results show that ethanol plants have statistically signi icant effects on the proportion of acres planted to corn in the plants' host counties. Furthermore, ceteris paribus, the land-use-change effect of locally owned plants (owned by local farmers or cooperatives) is about twice as large as the effect of plants with nonlocal owners. Environmental implications of the land-use change effect also are explored.
establishment of ethanol plants and the extent to which they occur, one can then precisely measure the environmental consequences (e.g., GHG emissions and changes in agricultural chemical applications) of expansion of the ethanol industry. These consequences are of interest to policymakers because if areas surrounding ethanol plants experience a greater magnitude of change in land use, then policies will be needed to improve agricultural management of such areas to mitigate the environmental effects of these land use changes.
There still is no consensus regarding the effect of ethanol plants on local grain prices and land values. McNew and Grif ith (2005) showed that ethanol plants increased local grain prices, but studies conducted by O'Brien (2009) and Katchova (2009) did not support that conclusion. Gallagher, Wisner, and Brubacker (2005) showed that grain prices increased in the vicinity of conventional nonlocal-owner plants while locally owned ethanol plants (owned by local corn producers and farmer cooperatives) did not have a statistically signi icant effect on local grain prices. Lewis (2010) showed that ethanol plants in Michigan and Kansas increased local grain prices while ethanol plants in Iowa and Indiana did not. Regarding the effect of ethanol plants on the value of crop land, Henderson and Gloy (2009) , using survey data from agricultural bankers in the Kansas City Federal Reserve District, found that proximity to ethanol plants increased the value of crop land. However, based on county-level cash rental rates for crop land in Iowa for 1987 through 2005, Du, Hennessy, and Edwards (2007) found that ethanol plants did not have a statistically signi icant effect on cash rental rates.
By answering such questions about the effects of ethanol plants on land use, we contribute to efforts to address the controversies mentioned by adding a supply-side dimension. This dimension can deepen our understanding of the relationship between ethanol plants and local grain prices as well as the relationship between ethanol plants and agricultural land values. Take Katchova (2009) , for example. That study showed that establishment of an ethanol plant did not affect local corn prices. Perhaps the plants in question did not affect the local supply of or demand for corn. Or the ethanol plants may have affected both demand and supply of corn but the two effects offset each other. An examination of changes in local land use can identify speci ic relationships between ethanol plants and local grain prices and hence provide information on effects on local land values.
There is a substantial literature on land use change (e.g., Wu and Segerson 1995 , Miller and Plantinga 1999 , Lubowski, Plantinga, and Stavins 2008 . Land use changes as a result of ethanol production have been attracting increasing attention since Searchinger et al. (2008) and Fargione et al. (2008) published works on the topic in Science. Li and Feng (2008) studied the effect of surging ethanol production on changes in land use due to increasing demand for corn. Keeney and Hertel (2009) applied a computable general equilibrium model to simulate global changes in land use from biofuel production. developed a simple and elegant theoretical framework that incorporated market equilibrium responses to biofuel production. They analyzed patterns of change in land use in response to an increase in ethanol demand from market and policy developments. Many studies have examined the local impacts of ethanol plants on grain prices and land values (e.g., McNew and Grif ith 2005 , O'Brien 2009 , Katchova 2009 , Gallagher, Wisner, and Brubacker 2005 , Lewis 2010 , Henderson and Gloy 2009 , Du, Hennessy, and Edwards 2007 but few have studied impacts on local land use. We aim to ill this gap. The study closest to this one in terms of scope is Turnquist, Fortenbery, and Foltz (2008) ; the authors studied the effect of ethanol plants on changes in both the aggregate number of acres in Wisconsin devoted to agriculture and on residential land values in the state. Their results showed that ethanol plants had no effect on changes in agricultural acreage or on residential land values in Wisconsin between 2000 and 2006. Rather than focusing on aggregate changes in agricultural acreage and residential land values, this study focuses on the effect of ethanol plants on the proportion of agricultural acres devoted to corn, de ined as harvested acres of corn for grain over total harvested acres of crops. The analysis is concentrated on Iowa because it is on the frontier of ethanol production in the United States and has experienced signi icant expansion of its ethanol industry (see Figures  1 and 2) .
2 In 2009, Iowa hosted 41 ethanol plants with a total nameplate production capacity of 2.9 billion gallons that accounted for about 27 percent of total production in the United States that year (RFA 2009). Using a panel data set that covers those 41 ethanol plants for 1997 through 2009, we study the effect of ethanol plants on the share of acres planted to corn while controlling for input and output prices.
Of the 41 plants, 11 were under local ownership (i.e., owned by local corn producers or farmer cooperatives). We ind that the share of acres planted to corn in a county hosting a local-owner (nonlocal-owner) 100-million-gallon ethanol plant is 7 (4) percentage points higher than a county that does not host such a plant, ceteris paribus. We assume that the area that supplies corn for the ethanol plant lies entirely within the county.
3 Based on estimates and parameters obtained from the literature regarding the environmental impacts of land use change, we further quantify the environmental impacts of the land use change (speci ically, from corn-soybean (CS) rotation to corn-corn (CC) rotation) caused by the establishment of a 100-million-gallon ethanol plant. We ind that establishment of such a plant will cause a 17 percent increase in GHG emissions solely from the change in land use in the host county. Water pollutants from agricultural production, such as nitrate-nitrogen and phosphorus, are affected by between -5.6 percent and 33 percent in the host county.
We next present a theoretical framework in which farmers allocate land between two crops to maximize their pro its. Thereafter, we discuss the econometric model and data used in the analysis, the results of our estimates and their implications, and the environmental impacts of the land use changes that come from installation of ethanol plants. In the inal section, we offer concluding thoughts and discuss potential extensions of this study.
Theoretical Framework
Following Wu and Segerson (1995) and Miller and Plantinga (1999) , we construct a simple land allocation model under a static pro it-maximization 2 We do not observe a clear trend for total harvested acres of corn in Iowa. A simple ordinary least square regression of total harvested acreage on year shows that the coef icient of year is statistically insigni icant (with a t-value at 0.36). This is intuitive because there is little marginal land left in Iowa. As a result, the only major way to increase corn production there is to change from a corn-soybean rotation to a corn-corn rotation. Therefore, we focus on the effect of ethanol plants on the share of corn acreage rather than on corn acreage or total crop land acreage.
3 It is possible that the corn supply area of a plant is shared by neighboring counties. Here, we make this assumption for ease of explanation. framework. Our model diverges from preceding studies in that we include transportation costs to re lect the impact of ethanol plants on land allocation. Establishment of an ethanol plant would provide a new local source of demand for corn and hence could reduce the transport distance between ields and markets. See McNew and Grif ith (2005) for a detailed discussion of how ethanol plants reduce corn producers' shipping costs. Suppose that there are N parcels of land having heterogeneous fertility within a county. Let a i denote the size of parcel i ∈ {1, . . ., N}. Let a i,j denote the acreage devoted to crop j ∈ {c,o} within parcel i where c stands for corn and o stands for other crops. 4 For each parcel i, the owner determines allocation of land to corn and other crops to maximize total pro it. Speci ically, then, 4 Other crops grown in Iowa include soybeans, hay, corn for silage, oats, and wheat. For 1997 If we label the share of acres in the county planted to crop j as s j , then (2) .
Equation (2) indicates that the share of acres of a crop is determined by output prices, input prices, distances to markets, and transportation costs. Since establishment of an ethanol plant could reduce the distance corn must be transported but would not affect the transportation distance for other crops, corn production could become more pro itable in the area close to the plant. In the empirical analysis, we use the capacity of ethanol plants in a county as a proxy for the magnitude by which an ethanol plant could contribute to reducing the transportation cost. As total ethanol production in a county expands, producers in the county can ship their corn to local ethanol plants. The greater a county's ethanol producing capacity, the greater the reduction in transportation costs for producers.
Econometric Methodology and Data
Adhering to the land use literature, we assume that the crop share in equation (2) has the logistic form. That is,
where k ∈ {1, . . ., K} is an index for the county, t ∈ {1, . . ., T} is an index for the year, exp() is the exponential function, X k,t is a vector of regressors, and β j is a vector of parameters for crop j. In this study, K = 99 and T = 13 since our data set covers Iowa's 99 counties for 13 years, 1997 through 2009. The model can be identi ied if we normalize β o (the vector of parameters for other crops) in through 2009, the average share of harvested acres was 42 percent for soybeans, 6 percent for corn, 1 percent for silage corn, 0.6 percent for oats, and 0.1 percent for wheat (calculated using data from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. For simplicity, we combined these ive crops into an "other crops" category.
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After we complete some algebraic rearrangements and add an error term that includes all other factors that affect the share of acres of corn,
.
In this study, the key independent variables in X k,t are ethanol plant indicesmeasures of ethanol production in a county that are labeled pil k,t and pinl k,t (explained hereafter). Other independent variables include three one-year lagged price ratios: (i) the ratio of the soybean price to the corn price, denoted as r sc ; (ii) the ratio of the input price index to the corn price, denoted as r ic ; and (iii) the ratio of the gasoline price to the corn price, denoted as r gc . We use price ratios instead of absolute price values because share equations are homogeneous of degree zero in prices. Therefore, what matters to the share of acres is the price ratio instead of the price level. 5 We implicitly assume that the expected price in year t equals the realized price in year t -1. Since a change in the share of crops in a county is unlikely to affect prices at a national level, national-level price ratios avoid causality running from the dependent variable (the log of the share of acres in corn) to the three independent variables (the price ratios). In addition, the three lagged price-ratio variables do not have a county subscript. To capture the crop rotation effect previously discussed and unobservable factors that lead to slow transitions in land use, we include lags of the dependent variable (ls k,c,t-l , l = 1, . . ., L) as explanatory variables where L ≤ T -1 is the maximum lag of the dependent variable. Year t is included as a regressor to capture the impacts of technology advances on land use. This time variable also aides in resolving the spurious correlation problem associated with both ethanol capacity and the share of acres to corn trending upward. Table 1 presents de initions and a statistical summary of the variables. Thus, equation (5) can be written as (6) where γ l , β c1 , . . ., β c6 are parameters to be estimated, u k is the unobserved ixed effect for county k, and e i,t is the error term.
Several econometric issues must be addressed before model (6) can be estimated. The irst is simultaneous causality. We are interested in causality that runs from ethanol plants to corn acreage decisions but causality may also run in the opposite direction. That is, ethanol plants are likely to be located in areas that have a high concentration of corn production. For example, Iowa is the number-one corn-producing state in the nation and hosts the largest number of ethanol plants of any state. Most of Iowa's ethanol plants are located in areas in which a large share of the agricultural land is planted to corn ( Figure 2) . Consequently, the ethanol-plant index variables (pil and pinl) are endogenous. The second issue is the presence of a lagged dependent variable. Due to crop rotations, corn acreage decisions in year t are affected by corn acreage decisions in year t -1, which were affected by decisions in year t -2, and so on. Since most corn in Iowa is planted in a corn-soybean rotation, a year with a high share of acres devoted to corn usually indicates that soybeans will have a high share of acres the following year and corn a low share. It is reasonable to include the lagged dependent variable in the right side of equation (6) to capture this rotation effect. However, the presence of the lagged dependent variable and autocorrelated errors may generate inconsistent parameter estimates (Wooldridge 2003, p. 394) . The third issue is that the time-constant variable u k may be correlated with the independent variables. For example, the suitability of agricultural land in a county for corn production largely determines the number of acres planted to corn. The fourth issue is that the data set has a relatively large panel (N = 99) and small time range (T = 13).
To address the econometric issues, we apply the Arellano-Bond (AB) difference-generalized method-of-moments (GMM) estimator (hereafter referred to as the AB estimator), which was developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) . The AB estimator uses irst differences to eliminate the time-constant variable, resolving issues with potential correlation between the unobserved time-constant variable and the Agricultural and Resource Economics Review independent variables. The estimator then uses the level or difference of further lagged dependent variables as instruments of the lagged dependent variables that appear on the right side of the econometric model. It also uses levels of lagged endogenous variables as instruments for corresponding endogenous variables. Additional instrumental variables can be applied for endogenous variables as well so the estimator resolves the issues of simultaneous causality and autocorrelation. Another bene it of using the AB estimator is that it is appropriate for a panel data set that has a short time range and a large number of panels (Roodman 2009 ). We employ two sets of additional instrumental variables for endogenous plant-index variables (pil and pinl). The irst is the aggregate ethanol production capacity of Iowa's local-owner plants and nonlocal-owner plants. Aggregate ethanol plant capacity is correlated with county-level ethanol plant capacities but does not depend on a value for an individual county. 6 The second set of variables includes three-year lagged ethanol prices. Since it takes about three years to construct an ethanol plant and bring it online, a plant's capacity in year t is correlated with the price of ethanol in year t -3.
7 Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the ethanol price will affect allocations of crop land only through the presence of ethanol plants once we control for the price of gasoline in the price ratio format. There are several reasons for this. An increase in the ethanol price will increase ethanol production capacity nationwide and hence increase demand for Iowa corn. Since the price for ethanol is determined largely by the price of gasoline, controlling for the gasoline price effectively controls for demand for corn from ethanol plants (or ethanol production) outside of Iowa, which allows us to separate the effects of ethanol plants in Iowa from ethanol plants elsewhere. Moreover, once we control for the price of gasoline, a shock included in the error term that would affect acres planted to corn would not likely affect the price of ethanol, which is determined largely by crude oil prices or gasoline prices . We do not include the ethanol price in the regressors because the substantial collinearity (with a correlation coef icient of 0.95 in our sample) between gasoline prices and ethanol prices makes the coef icients of both variables insigni icant.
We use a balanced panel data set that covers the 99 counties in Iowa for 1997 through 2009. The corn acreage share, s k,c,t , is calculated by dividing harvested acres of corn for grain by total harvested acres of all crops in county k in year t. Total harvested acres in a county is the sum of harvested acres of corn, soybeans, hay, corn for silage, oats, and wheat. The acreage data were obtained from NASS. 8 We divide the data set by type of ethanol plant: locally owned and nonlocally owned. This differentiation is of interest because we expect that local plant owners will purchase corn only from their own farms and hence will 6 A detailed discussion of using aggregate-level variables as instruments is provided by Wooldridge (2002, p. 133 ). An example of instruments similar to the ones used here is Mileva (2008) , which used the ratio of aggregate long-term capital in low of sampled countries to the sum of the gross domestic products of those countries as an instrument of an individual country's capital in low. 7 We tried using a two-year lagged ethanol price as an instrumental variable and found that the difference in estimation results between the two-year and the three-year lagged ethanol price was negligible. We also tried including both sets of instrumental variables (aggregate ethanol plant capacity and lagged ethanol price) in one estimation and found that the estimation results were only slightly affected. 8 Our data show that, on average, harvested acres of corn for silage are about 1.9 percent of harvested acres of corn for grain.
have larger land use effects (McNew and Grif ith 2005) . In the study sample, 11 of the 41 plants have local owners. Based on the plants' annual production capacity, we construct two ethanol plant indexes for each county in each year: one for local-owner plants, pil, and one for nonlocal-owner plants, pinl. No change of ownership from local to nonlocal or vice versa occurs in our sample.
Calculations of the indexes for local-owner (pil k,t ) and nonlocal-owner (pinl k,t ) plants are identical. Here we only illustrate how to calculate pil k,t . For one of the 11 local-owner ethanol plants (h ∈ {1, . . ., 11}), we calculate the plant's corn supply area (square miles) in year t, SA h,t , using (7) where C h,t is the nameplate capacity in million gallons for plant h in year t. If plant h does not exist in year t, then C h,t = 0. We observe changes in the nameplate capacity of a plant caused by production expansion. In the denominator of equation (7), 2.8 gallons per bushel is the conversion rate of corn to ethanol, 170 bushels per acre is the assumed yield of corn in Iowa, and 640 is used to convert square miles to acres. In the numerator of equation (7), the number 2 denotes that the share of corn acres in the supply area is assumed to be 50 percent, the sample mean of our data set. The values of the parameters in equation (7) do not matter very much for our purpose for reasons that will be obvious shortly. Next, following the tradition in the literature on ethanol plant effects, we assume that the corn supply area for an ethanol plant is round and centered at the plant. The radius of the supply area is readily calculated. Third, by applying ArcMap software, we measure the part of the supply area that is within county k, , such that .
We then take as given and, by applying equation (7), convert back into ethanol production capacity as the amount of the plant's capacity that affects county k, . That is, = 2.8  170  640 / (2  10 6 ). Since the equation acts only as a convertor between capacity and affected land area, one can see that the parameters in equation (7) do not matter very much. Finally, in year t, the aggregate ethanol capacity of the locally owned ethanol plants that affects county k is (8) where h is summed to 11 for the number of locally owned ethanol plants in our sample.
The major source of ethanol plant information for this study is annual editions of Ethanol Industry Outlook (RFA 2002 (RFA -2012 , which is edited by staff of RFA. Since the earliest available edition was 2002, we obtained production starting years for plants built before 2002 by visiting plant websites, searching local news reports, and contacting plant owners through emails and phone calls. Table 2 provides descriptive information about each plant in the study. The corn (soybean) price is calculated by averaging April prices for December (November) corn (soybean) futures. Corn and soybean future prices were (2013) . The price data are not county-speci ic so in period t the corn price (or soybean or input price) is the same for each county.
Empirical Analysis
We conduct the AB estimations of regression (6), shown in columns 1 through 4 in Table 3, using the Stata command "xtabond2." The table also reports the robust standard errors with small-sample correction. Columns 1 and 2 contain AB estimations for regression (6) with a maximum lag level of one (L = 1); columns 3 and 4 show the AB estimations with a maximum lag level of two (L = 2). The p-values from the Arellano-Bond test (AB test hereafter) for 
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irst-order and second-order autocorrelation in irst-differenced errors are presented in the last two rows of Table 3 . The null hypothesis for the AB test is no autocorrelation in irst-differenced errors. When the idiosyncratic errors are independently and identically distributed, the irst-differenced errors are only irst-order serially correlated. Autocorrelation in the irst-differenced errors at a second or higher order indicates that the idiosyncratic errors are correlated and that the moment conditions used in the AB estimations are not valid (Roodman 2009 ). Therefore, we can use only model speci ications that have no autocorrelation in the irst-differenced errors at a second or higher order. Since regression (6) with L = 2 does not have such autocorrelation but regression (6) with L = 1 does, we prefer the estimates with L = 2. Moreover, when L = 1 in the AB estimation, the Hansen test for overidenti ication rejects the null hypothesis that all of the instrument variables are valid at a 10 percent signi icance level (see the bottom of Table 3 ). However, when L = 2 in the AB estimation, the Hansen test does not reject the null hypothesis at the 10 percent signi icance level. For the estimations shown in columns 1 and 3, we use aggregate ethanol plant capacity as an additional instrument; for estimations in columns 2 and 4, we use a three-year lagged ethanol price as an additional instrument.
Columns 5 through 8 in Table 3 show the results of county-level ixed effects estimations of regression (6). We report these results because we are interested in what the county-level ixed effects estimations would be if we did not use AB estimations to correct the econometric problems associated with regression (6). Columns 5 and 6 include a one-year lag of the dependent variable as a regressor while columns 7 and 8 include both one-year and two-year lags of the dependent variable. The regressions reported in columns 5 through 8 used further lags of the dependent variable and of the endogenous variables as instrumental variables. Moreover, the regressions shown in columns 5 and 7 used aggregate ethanol plant capacity as the additional instrument while the models reported in columns 6 and 8 used the three-year lagged ethanol price as an additional instrument.
The results show that the signs of the estimates in columns 5 through 8 are consistent with those in columns 1 through 4. Also, the coef icients of the two key variables, pil and pinl, in columns 7 and 8 are close to those in columns 3 and 4. However, there is a large difference between AB estimations and ixed effects estimations in the coef icients of the lagged dependent variables and the price ratio variables. The Wooldridge test for serial correlation shows that there is serial correlation of the idiosyncratic errors of the ixed effects regressions, which indicates that the Arellano-Bond estimations shown in columns 3 and 4 are better choices than the ixed effects estimations.
When we compare columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 , we ind no signi icant quantitative difference between the parameters. For example, in column 3 the coef icients of two key variables in our study, the local-owner and nonlocalowner plant indexes, are 0.00316 and 0.00198, respectively. In column 4, the same coef icients are 0.00317 and 0.0019. The variables are signi icant in both model speci ications. Therefore, results from the two speci ications regarding the effects of ethanol plants on land use are virtually the same. Since the p-value for the regression in column 4 is larger than the p-value in column 3 for the AB test in second-order autocorrelation (0.25 versus 0.18) and a larger p-value indicates that idiosyncratic errors in the model are more likely to be independent, we focus on the estimation results shown in column 4 in the remainder of the discussion.
Looking at the results in column 4 of Table 3 , we observe that the coef icient of the local-owner ethanol-plant index (pil), 0.00317, is signi icantly larger than that of the nonlocal-owner ethanol-plant index (pinl), 0.0019. To simplify the discussion going forward, we assume that the share of corn acres in a county is 50 percent, the sample mean of the data set, and that the corn supply area of an ethanol plant falls entirely within that county. In that case, establishment of a 100-million-gallon locally owned ethanol plant in that county would increase the share of acres devoted to corn in the county to 57 percent. 9 However, when the 100-million-gallon ethanol plant is not local-owned, the share of corn acres would increase to 54 percent. Thus, a local-owner ethanol plant has a larger in luence on land use than a nonlocal-owner one. This conclusion is intuitive because local owners are more likely to purchase corn from their own farms (McNew and Grif ith 2005) .
One can calculate the long-term effects using the estimates shown in column 4 of Table 3 . By setting ls i,t = ls i,t-1 = ls i,t-2 and rearranging equation (6), we obtain the long-run effect of locally owned ethanol plants, :
Plugging corresponding coef icients from column 4 into equation (9), we obtain = 0.0029. In the long run, then, a local-owner 100-million-gallon ethanol plant will increase the ratio between share of corn acres and share of other crop acres by 29 percent in the host county. Similarly, we can calculate the long-run effect of nonlocal-owner ethanol plants, = 0.0017. By the same procedure described in footnote 9, we determine that establishment of a locally owned 100-million-gallon ethanol plant will cause the share of corn acres to increase over the long run to 56.3 percent in the host county. For a nonlocalowner plant, the share of corn acres increases to 53.9 percent. Thus, an ethanol plant's long-term effect on the share of acres planted to corn is slightly smaller than the short-term effect.
These calculations are consistent with a standard supply-demand analysis for the corn market. Imagine a positive demand shock caused by establishment of an ethanol plant in period t. That shock will shift the corn-demand curve upward and increase the price for corn. In period t + 1, corn producers respond to higher prices by producing a corresponding quantity of corn. In the long run, when a new equilibrium is reached, the equilibrium price and quantity supplied (i.e., the long-run effects) will be smaller than the irst-round reaction of the corn supply.
We thus conclude that establishment of ethanol plants can increase the local supply of corn in both the short run and the long run. This increase in supply will put downward pressure on corn prices and hence on land values. However, the presence of ethanol plants can generate upward pressure on corn prices and land values by increasing demand for corn and reducing the cost of shipping corn to demand centers (McNew and Grif ith 2005) . The magnitude of change in the equilibrium corn price or land value after establishment of an ethanol plant depends on the relative magnitudes of these opposing forces. This complex interplay explains why some recent studies of the effects of ethanol plants on grain prices and land values have generated contradictory indings.
From column 4 in Table 3 , we see that an increase in the soybean-corn price ratio or the input-corn price ratio decreases the share of acres planted to corn in a county, which is consistent with intuition. However, the coef icient of the gasoline-corn price ratio requires some explanation. On one hand, since gasoline is an input in agricultural production when used as fuel for agricultural machinery, gasoline becoming relatively more expensive would make corn production less pro itable. On the other hand, however, the price of gasoline is highly correlated with the price of ethanol (a coef icient of 0.95 in our sample) so an increase in the price of gasoline could make ethanol production more pro itable and spur additional planting of corn. Since fuel accounts for only a small part of the cost of corn production, it is reasonable to assume that gasoline's in luence on the price of ethanol would dominate its effect on the cost of corn production.
10 Thus, the coef icient of the gasoline-corn price ratio is positive and signi icant.
Environmental Impacts: A Numerical Example
Ethanol plants can generate indirect environmental impacts by affecting farmers' land use decisions. For example, corn production typically requires a larger quantity of fertilizer than soybean production, leading to additional GHG emissions and fertilizer run-off. We investigate these environmental impacts by comparing GHG emissions and levels of water pollutants under two scenarios: a baseline scenario with no ethanol production and an ethanol-plant scenario in which a 100-million-gallon corn-based ethanol plant is established. These calculations are based on the estimates shown in column 4 of Table 3 and on parameters for the environmental impacts of GHG emissions and water quality obtained from published research (Feng, Rubin, and Babcock 2010, Thomas, Engel, and Chaubey 2009) . 11 We do not consider emissions at the re inery phase of ethanol production. In our calculation, we assume that the ethanol plant has a local owner (impacts of nonlocal-owner plants can be calculated in the same way). Since impacts of nonlocally owned ethanol plants on land use are less signi icant than impacts from locally owned plants, we expect that nonlocal-owner plants will have a smaller environmental impact at the county level. For the baseline scenario, the share of corn acres and the total crop land acres in a county are assumed to be the sample means of the data, 50 percent and 242,871 acres. We further assume that only corn and soybeans are planted in the county and that a CS rotation is the baseline production process.
If a locally owned 100-million-gallon ethanol plant is established in a county, then, as calculated in the previous section, the share of acres devoted to corn will increase to 56.3 percent in the long run. As a result, 12.6 percent of the acres in the county will be converted from a CS rotation to a CC rotation. According to Tables 2 and 3 in Feng, Rubin, and Babcock (2010) , we know that (i) there will be a 10 percent decrease in corn yield when switching from CS rotation to CC rotation and (ii) producing the same quantity of corn from the CC rotation will emit, on average, 35 percent more GHGs than producing from the CS rotation.
12 Therefore, we know that per-acre GHG emissions under the CC rotation will be 21.5 percent higher than emissions under the CS rotation (calculated as (1 -10%)  (1 + 35%) -1). From Table 4 of Feng, Rubin, and Babcock (2010) , we know that corn production per acre under a CS rotation will generate about 185 percent more GHG emissions than will soybean production. Therefore, we calculate that one acre of corn under the CC rotation generates about 246 percent more GHG emissions than an acre of soybean production: (1 + 185%)  (1 + 21.5%) -1. Based on this information, we determine that the increase in GHG emissions under the ethanol-plant scenario is approximately 17 percent (12.6%  [0.5  (21.5% + 247%)] ≈ 17%). We multiply the sum of 21.5 percent and 247 percent by 0.5 because half the land is devoted to corn and half to soybeans when no conversion occurs. In terms of absolute quantities, the 17 percent emission increase in the county means that the equivalent of 2,691,982 kilograms (kg) of additional carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) will be emitted per year. 13 Feng, Rubin, and Babcock (2010) reported an industry average of 3.18 kg of CO 2 -equivalent per gallon of ethanol produced in the re inery phase. Thus, on average, a 100-million-gallon ethanol plant will emit 3.18 million kg of CO 2 -equivalent per year in the re inery phase if running at full capacity. One can see, then, that the additional GHG emissions caused by land use changes in response to an ethanol plant are about 84.7 percent of the plant's total GHG emissions at the re inery phase.
Next we examine impacts on water quality from a locally owned 100-milliongallon ethanol plant. For this analysis, we obtained environmental impact coef icients from Thomas, Engel, and Chaubey (2009) , a study of water-quality impacts of corn production under CS and CC rotations based on three types of soil in Allen County, Indiana.
14 In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 , we present the water-quality-impact parameters. We use parameters related to Hoytville clay soil because its corn yield potential is similar to yields of corn grown in Iowa and it accounts for 90 percent of the area studied in Thomas, Engel, and Chaubey (2009) . We incorporate impacts of corn production on erosion, nitrate-nitrogen run-off and leaching, total phosphorus, atrazine run-off and leaching, and pyraclostrobin. For example, when a producer changes from a CS to a CC rotation, annual erosion will rise from 0.24 to 0.29 metric tons per acre, a 22 percent increase. Nitrate-nitrogen leached to the ground will rise from 2.78 to 4.22 kg per acre, a 52 percent increase. The impact of land use changes generated by the 100-million-gallon ethanol plant on water quality equals the annual percentage increase in the environmental impact per acre (e.g., the 22 percent increase in nitrate-nitrogen leaching) times the proportion 12 In this case, corn yields decline and GHG emissions increase because the CC rotation foregoes the bene it of carryover nitrogen provided by the soybean crop. As a result, producers typically apply more nitrogen. 13 We calculate the 2,691,982 kg of additional CO 2 -equivalent as follows. First, from Table 4 of Feng, Rubin, and Babcock (2010) , we obtain weighted average emissions from soybean and corn production in Iowa under a CS rotation, about 33.9 and 96.5 kg per acre respectively. The weight is the distribution of tillage for corn and soybeans listed in the table. Second, we calculate the increase in emissions as 17 percent × 242,871 × 0.5 × (33.9 + 96.5) ≈ 2,691,982.
14 Unfortunately, we could not ind similar studies of the effects of Iowa corn production on water quality. We believe that the results from Thomas, Engel, and Chaubey (2009) of total acres of land that will be converted to the CC rotation (12.6 percent). Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 report the results of these calculations. Changes in water-pollution components in the county range from -5.6 percent to 33 percent. Speci ically, losses of nitrate-nitrogen increase 1.4 percent and total phosphorus in surface run-off increases 33 percent, which amounts to an annual loss of 4,706 kg of nitrate-nitrogen and 5,201 kg of phosphorus (column 5). The concentration of atrazine (a component of popular herbicides) in run-off increases 2.9 percent. However, the concentration of atrazine leached to ground water decreases 5.6 percent. This may be because surface run-off increases when land is converted to a CC rotation and atrazine is a relatively mobile compound that may be more likely to wind up in run-off than to leach into the ground.
Conclusions and Discussions
We analyzed the effects of land use changes that occurred in Iowa between 1997 and 2009 in response to establishment of ethanol plants by applying a logit land-share model. AB estimation addressed econometric issues associated with the model (autocorrelation, endogeneity, unobserved time-constant variables, and sample size). Using a county-level panel data set consisting of shares of crop acres in Iowa devoted to corn, indexes of production capacity of the ethanol plants, and multiple price ratios, we demonstrated that ethanol Notes: Data in columns 1 and 2 were obtained from Thomas, Engel, and Chaubey (2009) . Using this data, we calculated impacts on water quality, which are listed in columns 3 through 5. Speci ically, column 3 shows percentage increases from column 1 to column 2. Column 4 is calculated by multiplying the values in column 3 by 12.6 percent; 12.6 percent of crop lands are switched from a CS rotation to a CC rotation in response to establishment of a 100-million-gallon ethanol plant. Column 5 is calculated as 242,871  12.6%  (column 2 -column 1) where 242,871 is crop land acreage for a typical Iowa county. plants had a signi icant effect on land use in a county. In particular, the effect of locally owned plants was nearly two times larger than the effect of nonlocally owned plants. Moreover, by incorporating perspective on the supply dimension, we shed light on the relationship of ethanol plants to local grain prices and land values.
Once the relationship between ethanol plants and local land use was established, we further estimated the direct environmental effects of plantinduced land use changes. The results show that changing the crop rotation from corn-soybean to corn-corn had a signi icant negative impact on the environment via increased GHG emissions and degraded water quality. A useful expansion of this study would be to enlarge the sample to include all plants in the United States. This would allow for a comprehensive study of the economic and environmental impacts of corn-based ethanol production.
